Wills - Revocation by Change in Circumstances - Effect of a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement by Haerle, Paul R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 7 
1955 
Wills - Revocation by Change in Circumstances - Effect of a 
Separation and Property Settlement Agreement 
Paul R. Haerle 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, Family Law Commons, and the 
Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul R. Haerle, Wills - Revocation by Change in Circumstances - Effect of a Separation and Property 
Settlement Agreement, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss7/22 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1018 MmmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
Wn.Ls-R:svoCATION BY CHANGE IN CmcuMSTANCES-EFFECT OF A SEPA-
RATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT-Testator's will, executed in 
1944, named his wife executrix and sole devisee. One month before his death 
in 1952 he entered into a detailed separation and property settlement agreement 
with her in which, though not referring directly to the will, the wife released any 
present, future or after-acquired interest in the same realty as was devised in 
the will. The widow's offering of the will for probate was contested by the 
heirs. The lower court directed a verdict for the contestants on the ground that 
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the agreement operated to revoke the will. On appeal, held, reversed. Since 
neither a divorce alone nor a property settlement alone will work a revocation by 
operation of law because of the change in circumstance, a separation and property 
settlement agreement will not do so. Price v. Price, (Tenn. App. 1954) 269 
s.w. (2d) 920. 
Generally, statutes will determine whether a jurisdiction will recognize any 
form of marital severance as working a revocation of the provisions for one spouse 
in the will of the other because of the change in circumstances. Tennessee 
appears to be the only jurisdiction completely lacking a statute on revocation of 
wills.1 The statutes of other states may be divided between those providing 
specific means for revocation of a will, but with a saving clause recognizing 
revocation by change in circumstances,2 and those without such a saving clause,8 
some of which expressly deny the possibility of revocation by change in cir-
cumstances.4 As divorce was relatively unknown at English common law, the 
change in circumstances concept was there limited to cases where marriage or 
marriage and birth of issue were held to revoke the prior will of a woman or 
man respectively.15 Though the concept is expanded in this country,6 prior to 
the instant holding the question of whether a separation and property settlement 
is included within it had been decided only twice. Michigan appears to support 
the decision,7 while a lower Pennsylvania court does not.8 In contrast, the same 
1 Blackard, "The Effects of the Enactment of the 1941 Wills Act," 17 TENN. L. R:sv. 
447 at 450-451 (1942). 
2Not including divorce as one of the means, e.g.: Mass. Laws Ann. (1933) c. 191, 
§§8, 9; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §702.9; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2107.33; 
Wis. Stat. (1953) §238.14; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §6-306. Including divorce as one 
of the means: Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§525.19, 525.191. 
8 Not including divorce as one of the means, e.g.: Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953) 
§§70-74; Iowa Code Ann. (1950) tit. 32, §633.10; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1949) §§34, 35, 40; Tex. Rev. Stat. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8285; W.Va. Code (1949) 
§§4044-4045. Including divorce as one of the means: Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1953) tit. 
61, §§9(1), 26; Fla. Stat. (1953) §§731.12, 731.14, 732.261; Ga. Code Ann. (1935; 
Supp. 1954) tit. 113, §§401-408; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 59, §§610-611; Pa. Stat. 
Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §§180.5, 180.7; Wash. Rev. Stat. (1953) tit. 11, c. 12.040, 
12.050. 
4 Not including divorce as one of the means: R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 566, §§16-18. 
Including divorce as one of the means: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947; Supp. 1953) §§60-113, 
60-ll5, 60-407; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) c. 31, §§5.I to 5.4. See Model Probate Code 
§§51-54 (1946). Including divorce and annulment among the means: Ind. Stat. Ann. 
(1953) §§6.506, 6.508. 
5 ATKINsoN, WILLS, 2d ed., §85 (1953). The Statute of Wills of 1837 abrogated the 
doctrine in England. 7 Wm. IV & 1 Viet., c. 26, §20 (1837). For a further historical 
discussion, see 5 Wis. L. Rav. 387 (1930). 
6 See the cases cited in notes 9, IO, and 11 infra. 
7 In re Blanchard's Estate, 267 Mich. 189, 255 N.W. 190 (1934), noted in 33 MICH. 
L. Rav. 637 (1935). The case is weak authority, however, since the court appears to lean 
on extrinsic factors, e.g., that the testator and his wife had been reunited before his death. 
Accord, Walter v. Pugh, 30 Ohio Op. 561 (1945), holding that an antenuptial property 
settlement was not an implied revocation of the wife's will, wherein the man later to be 
her husband was made residuary legatee on condition that they were married. 
s In re Morris' Estate, 22 Pa. Dist. R. 466 (1912). This case, too, is weak authority 
on the point because the holding, a short and alternative one, displays some confusion in 
the court's mind between revocation by change in circumstances, ademption and satisfaction. 
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court that decided the principal case and the heavy majority of courts inter-
preting statutes with the saving clause have held that provisions for the spouse 
in a will are revoked by a divorce and a property settlement, 9 or an annulment 
and a property settlement,1° occasionally with considerable liberality as to what 
constitutes the requisite property adjustment.11 As jurisdictions with statutes 
lacking the saving clause hold that a divorce even with such a settlement will 
not work a revocation12 because the enumerated methods are deemed exclu-
sive,13 argument as to the effect of a separation and property agreement on that 
basis is seldom attempted. Rather, the issue generally is whether the agreement 
constitutes such a subsequent writing by the testator as may revoke the will.14 
The largely unexplored issue of whether the property disposition alone works 
as a satisfaction of the provisions for the spouse is also present.15 The problem 
is thus narrowed to whether, under statutes allowing revocation by change in 
circumstances, a distinction should be drawn between divorce and separation, 
each accompanied by property settlements. An affirmative answer would un-
Though the Wyoming court in Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532 at 544-545, 52 P. (2d) 
1219 (1935), saw the holding as involving revocation, the Pennsylvania statute then in 
force lacked a saving clause. Pa. Laws 1833, No. 250-1, §§13-16. Because of this, a tes-
·tator's divorce was held not to produce a revocation. Jones' Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 60 A. 915 
(1905). For indications obiter that, had the statutes so permitted, similar actions might 
amount to such a revocation, see Swann v. Swann, 131 W.Va. 555, 48 S.E. (2d) 425 
(1948). Cf. In re Will of Watson, 213 N.C. 309, 195 S.E. 772 (1938). 
9 Rankin v. McDearmon, (Tenn. App. 1953) 270 S.W. (2d) 660; Estate of Kort, 
260 Wis. 621, 51 N.W. (2d) 501 (1952); Younker v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St. 409, 116 
N.E. (2d) 715 (1954), distinguishing Codner v. Caldwell, 156 Ohio St. 197, 101 N.E. 
(2d) 901 (1951), noted in 23 Umv. Cm. L. furv. 277 (1954). Contra, Hertrais v. Moore, 
325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E. (2d) 909 (1949), noted in 50 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1950). The 
earlier cases are collected in the annotation, 18 A.L.R. (2d) 697 at 705 (1951). See 5 
WBS'I'. REs. L. Rirv. 394 (1954). 
10 Johnston v. Laird, note 8 supra. 
11 See In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1, 199 N.W. 686 (1924), wherein a so-
called waiver of alimony rights was deemed sufficient. 
12Jreland v. Terwilliger, (Fla. 1951) 54 S. (2d) 52; Davis v. Davis, (Fla. 1952) 57 
S. (2d) 8 (the section of the Florida statute last cited, note 3 supra, had not yet taken 
effect); Merritt v. Merritt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 158 S.W. (2d) ll6. Contra, Matter 
of Gilmour, 146 Misc. ll3, 260 N.Y.S. 761 (1932). That this opinion is highly question-
able, see Matter of Sussdorff, 182 Misc. 69, 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 762 (1943). The earlier 
cases are collected in the annotation, 18 A.L.R. (2d) 697 at 708 (1951). 
13 But see In re Estate of Brown, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N.W. 260 (1908). Further, 
several states lacking the saving clause will allow revocation of a will due to a change in 
circumstances when the change is of early common law heritage, i. e., marriage or marriage 
plus birth of issue. Durfee, ''Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition 
or Circumstances of the Testator," 40 M:rcH. L. Rnv. 406 at 408-412 (1942). 
14Titus v. Bassi, 182 App. Div. 387, 169 N.Y.S. 49 (1918); Matter of Crounse, 
168 Misc. 359, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 32 (1938), affd. 261 App. Div. 77, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) 568 
(1941); Matter of Cote's Will, 195 Misc. 410, 87 N.Y.S. (2d) 555 (1949); Estate of 
Crane, 6 Cal. (2d) 218, 57 P. (2d) 476 (1936); Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Cal. (2d) 485, 
150 P. (2d) 416 (1944); In re Bartolo's Estate, 124 Cal. App. (2d) 727, 269 P. (2d) 30 
(1954); Swann v. Swann, note 8 supra; Merritt v. Merritt, note 12 supra. 
15 See In re Brown's Estate, note 13 supra; Swann v. Swann, note 8 supra; Matter 
of Swords, 120 Misc. 427, 199 N.Y.S. 672 (1923), affd. 208 App. Div. 852, 204 N.Y.S. 
952 (1924); Rash v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284, 146 S. 814 (1933). Language approved in 
Berg v. Berg, 201 Minn. 179 at 189, 275 N.W. 836 (1937), suggests that this might be 
the issue involved even under a statute with a saving clause. 
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doubtedly be based on the voluntary and more often temporary nature of sepa-
ration as compared to judicially decreed divorce. But a distinction strictly along 
such lines is not entirely satisfactory, for the primary basis of the decisions in 
the divorce cases is the presumed intent of the testator, rather than a judicial 
policy determination against disinherison as in the cases of marriage or marriage 
and birth of issue.16 And it is certainly not unreasonable to presume, in cases 
like the instant one, that the intent of the testator would be to revoke the pro-
visions for his spouse in his will. To the objection that such an intent ought not 
to be conclusively, nor even as readily, presumed as in an instance of divorce, 17 
the possibility of relying on a rebuttable presumption of revocation may be 
suggested.18 
PaulR.Haerle 
16 Durfee, ''Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circum-
stances of the Testator," 40 Mi:CH. L. REv. 406 at 416 (1942). Compare the thinking of 
the court in Will of Battis, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910), with that in Hoy v. Hoy, 
93 Miss. 732, 48 S. 903 (1908). 
17 Rankin v. McDeannon, note 9 supra; Estate of Kort, note 9 supra. See annotation, 
18 A.L.R. (2d) 697 at 700 (1951). See also 23 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 277 at 279-280 
(1954), where it is suggested that some language in Younker v. Johnson, note 9 supra, 
implies a contraiy view. 
18 This solution has been urged for cases involving divorce with a property settlement. 
Durfee, "Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances 
of the Testator," 40 Mi:CH. L. REv. 406 at 416 (1942); 50 Coi.. L. REv. 531 at 534 
(1950). 
